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In this paper we use quantitative techniques to assess whether gender makes a 
difference in employment arbitration. Specifically, we focus on the experience in the 
securities industry where employment arbitration was introduced in 1986. Over the 
period 1986-2008, approximately 3,200 arbitration awards were issued in employment 
disputes arising in the industry. In every case the employee (and his or her attorney) 
presented the arbitrator with a monetary figure representing the damages associated with 
the claim; the figure presented to the arbitrator usually included the claimant’s demand 
for back pay and often included punitive damages as well. The employers in these cases 
always denied that the employees’ claims had merit (and frequently filed counterclaims); 
the employer-respondent maintained in each of these cases that the arbitrator should not 
award the employee-claimant any money at all (Lipsky, Seeber, and Lamare, 2010). 
Considerable variation exists in the size of these monetary awards, and in our 
research we developed hypotheses and regression models to explain this variation. We 
were able to translate the information contained in the awards into a very large database, 
and in this paper we use logistic regressions to estimate whether the monetary awards 
were influenced by the gender of the complainant, the complainant’s attorney, the 
respondent’s attorney, or the arbitrator (controlling for other variables). 
We find that, depending on the definition of the dependent variable, the gender of 
the complainant and the complainant’s attorney (but not the gender of the respondent’s 
attorney or the arbitrator), had significant effects on the size of the award. In general, 
female complainants did less well than male complainants in employment arbitration in 
the securities industry. We should note that our results are quite robust and persisted 
even when alternative specifications of the regressions were estimated. Following the 
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presentation of our statistical findings, we explore alternative interpretations of their 
meaning, examining whether the gender variables in our analysis are proxies for other 
factors that might have influenced the outcomes in these arbitration cases. In most of 
these experiments, however, we could not find plausible factors that eliminated the 
gender effects. 
It is commonly acknowledged that discrimination against women has been a 
widespread phenomenon on Wall Street (see, for example, Antilla, 2002; Chung, 2010, 
Roth, 2007; Selmi, 2005). Despite a rash of class action lawsuits over the last two 
decades in which women charged major Wall Street firms with sex discrimination, 
reports in the financial and business press and on the internet suggest that sex 
discrimination is a persistent problem in the securities industry (see, for example, Hewlett, 
2010; Horn, 2010; Sherter, 2010; Tecco, 2010; Wallace, 2010).1 Many securities firms 
have taken measures to correct overt forms of sexism, and there are numerous women 
who have forged successful careers on Wall Street (see, for example, Herera, 1997; 
Siebert; 2002). But the industry and the arbitration profession remain heavily dominated 
by men, and it is possible that vestiges of bias remain in these institutions and underlie 
our findings. 
The Motivation for Our Research 
Two factors motivate the research we report in this paper. First, the rise of 
employment arbitration in the United States has been accompanied by concerns about 
whether the procedure provides a fair and equitable forum for the parties that use it. On 
the one hand, proponents of the practice maintain that arbitration provides a faster and 
cheaper means of resolving employment disputes than litigation. Support for the use of 
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arbitration to resolve employment disputes has been reinforced by several seminal 
Supreme Court decisions.2 On the other hand, opponents of the practice argue that 
arbitration is not an adequate substitute for a judicial forum because it does not provide a 
level playing field for employment disputes (for a summary of arguments on both sides of 
this debate, see Seeber and Lipsky, 2006). Critics of the practice maintain that arbitration 
ordinarily does not provide due process protections that are equivalent to the protections 
both parties (but especially employees) would receive if their dispute was heard in a court 
of law. Arbitration has been criticized on several grounds: critics contend, for example, 
that it does not guarantee adequate discovery, appropriate representation, protections 
against conflicts of interest, and the competency and impartiality of the arbitrator.3 
Certainly most observers would agree that if the procedure results in the treatment of 
disputants that varies significantly by their gender, race, religion, nationality, or disability, 
it does not meet an elementary criterion of fairness. In this paper we focus on whether 
gender matters in employment arbitration. 
Only within the last decade or so have researchers begun to do rigorous statistical 
analyses of critical issues in employment arbitration. As Colvin has noted, the research 
gap is due in part to “the dearth of publicly available data on which to conduct empirical 
research that would help evaluate the arguments on both sides of the employment 
arbitration debate” (Colvin, 2009). In contrast to most employment arbitration awards, 
all arbitration awards in the securities industry are publicly available and hence allow us 
to conduct the analysis presented in this paper. 
The second factor motivating our research is the fact, as we have noted, that Wall 
Street, and more generally the securities industry, has not always been a hospitable place 
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for women. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that for most of its history a hostile 
atmosphere for women was commonplace in the industry. As Roth has written, “Not so 
long ago—as recently as the mid-1980s—Wall Street was one big men’s club of smoked-
filled rooms and strippers on the trading floor. Women, to the degree that they were 
welcome at all, were relegated to roles as secretaries and sex objects. Firms blatantly 
discriminated against the few women who did fight to become traders, and court cases 
demonstrate a long history of groping, name calling, come-ons, blocked mobility, and 
sexual pranks” (Roth, 2007; for a thorough description of the discriminatory conditions 
women faced on Wall Street through the early part of this century, see Antilla, 2002). 
Over the last fifteen years, major class action lawsuits were brought against Smith Barney, 
Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, charging those firms with the improper treatment of 
women.4 Each firm paid out more than $100 million to resolve these lawsuits, although 
each firm denied that it had engaged in any systematic discrimination against women 
(Roth, 2007). 
Some scholars believe that in recent years the treatment of women in the 
securities industry has improved appreciably, in part because of these class action 
lawsuits (Selmi, 2005). And it would be unfair to paint all firms in the securities 
industry with the same brush. For example, Prudential Financial, Inc., one of the largest 
companies in the financial services industry, was the target of two major class action 
lawsuits in the 1990s. But these lawsuits appear to have been a wakeup call for 
Prudential’s top management. The company promulgated a code of ethics, and top 
management took several significant steps to implement the code. It developed a 
sophisticated integrated conflict management system to handle employee complaints, and 
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in 1999 it appointed a dynamic leader to be both vice president in charge of managing 
this system and the company’s chief ethics officer. Prudential, headquartered in Newark, 
New Jersey, also initiated programs that focus on the value of diversity in hiring and 
employment. For the past fifteen years the company has been listed by Working Mother 
as one of the “100 Best Companies for Working Mothers” in the U.S., and that 
publication now includes the company in its “Hall of Fame.”5 
Many observers contend, however, that sexism continues to plague the securities 
industry. In 2010 women alleging sex discrimination filed class action lawsuits against 
both Goldman Sachs and Bank of America Merrill Lynch; both firms have denied that 
these suits have any merit. Nevertheless, reports of “women fleeing Wall Street” have 
been abundant in the financial and business press. In the past decade 141,000 women, or 
2.6 percent of the female workforce, left the industry, while the number of men working 
for Wall Street firms grew by 389,000, 9.6 percent of the male workforce (Wallace, 
2010). “The economic downturn produced a talent pool overflowing with highly 
qualified candidates, both men and women, but evidence suggests that the bar for women 
to reenter Wall Street is disproportionately high” (Hewlett, 2010). 
Arbitration in the Securities Industry 
In 1958 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) “established a rule that any 
controversy between a broker and the broker’s firm would be settled by arbitration” 
(Antilla, p. 143). In 1968 the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) 
developed a Code of Arbitration Procedure, which was adopted as a voluntary program. 
But in 1972 the Code was made mandatory for members and registered persons.6 In 2007 
the enforcement, regulatory, and dispute resolution programs of the NASD and the NYSE 
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were merged under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).7 For the sake 
of simplifying matters, hereinafter we will refer to all arbitration cases arising under the 
NASD, the NYSE, and FINRA as FINRA cases. 
FINRA is “the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business 
in the United States,” overseeing nearly 4,750 brokerage firms and 633,000 registered 
securities representatives. It administers “the largest dispute resolution forum for 
investors in registered firms,” and it provides arbitration and mediation services for 
claims involving customers and brokers (in 2008, about 75 percent of all filings), brokers 
and brokers (2 percent of filings), and employees and their firms (23 percent of filings).8 
The FINRA employment dispute resolution program covers only “associated persons” in 
the securities industry; associated persons are employees who are registered with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and can accept and execute customers’ buy-and-
sell orders. It is estimated that about one-third of the employees in the industry are 
registered representatives. (Hereinafter we will use the term “employee” to refer only to 
registered representatives.) There are approximately 6,100 arbitrators on the FINRA 
roster. Between 1994 and 2008 there were over 90,000 claims involving customers and 
brokers and over 2,600 claims involving employees and employers.9 
The financial crisis that began in 2008 led directly to a dramatic increase in 
FINRA case filings, which more than doubled between 2007 and 2009 (from 3,238 in 
2007 to 7,137 in 2009).10 Although an analysis of the customer-broker cases would 
clearly be valuable, our interest in employment relations has led us to focus on the 
employment claims heard under FINRA auspices.11 
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Women, Wall Street, and Arbitration 
In the 1980s, as an increasing number of women were initiating lawsuits charging 
their Wall Street employers with sex discrimination (Antilla, 2002; Roth, 2007; Selmi, 
2005; and Chung, 2010), the securities industry established its employment arbitration 
program to handle a wide array of employment complaints, including those alleging 
discrimination. Figure 1 shows the types of claims made by employees in the 3,200 
awards we analyzed: in 28 percent employees claimed their employer had denied them 
compensation they had been owed; in 27.4 percent they claimed their employer had 
defamed them in some fashion (e.g., by alleging they had “churned” a customer’s 
account); in 13.5 percent employees claimed they had been wrongfully terminated; and in 
8.4 percent they claimed their employer breached their contract. Cases involving a claim 
of statutory discrimination constituted 17.1 percent of the total, that is, over 540 cases. 
Not all of these cases, of course, involved a charge of sex discrimination; about 340 did, 
while the remaining involved charges of discrimination on the basis of race, age, religion, 
nationality, or disability.12 In other words, slightly more than 10 percent of the FINRA 
awards involved a charge of sex discrimination. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In fact, many of the women who brought charges against their firms wanted their 
day in court and believed they would not receive fair treatment in a mandatory arbitration 
system that had been promulgated by the industry. These women had the usual 
complaints about the deficiencies of employment arbitration, and they were especially 
concerned about the difficulty of appealing arbitrators’ decisions in the courts (see, for 
example, Antilla, 2002, pp. 137-160).13 Antilla reports that plaintiffs’ attorneys, several 
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of whom were well known in the legal community for their opposition to employment 
arbitration, encouraged their female clients to bring class action suits against their Wall 
Street employers. Neither the New York Stock Exchange nor the National Association of 
Securities Dealers hears class action complaints in their arbitration systems, so the 
attorneys advised their clients that the best strategy for avoiding mandatory arbitration 
was the class action approach. The attorneys believed that the tactic of filing a class 
action suit, “by its very ingenuity, would at a minimum get the story out to the public, 
regardless of whether the case actually went to trial” (Antilla, p. 139). 
Reports on the Smith Barney, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley class action 
lawsuits indicate that the vast majority of women in these suits settled their claims 
through negotiation or mediation. Ironically, however, some of the women needed to 
accept arbitration as the forum to resolve their complaints after negotiation and mediation 
failed to do so. The outcomes of these arbitration cases varied greatly. For example, an 
arbitration panel awarded a woman named Hydie Sumner, a former Merrill Lynch 
employee, an award of $2.2 million (Chung, p. 233). But, an arbitration panel in a case 
involving a woman named Edna Broyles, who had been a broker in a Tampa, Florida, 
branch office of Shearson Lehman and was one of the plaintiffs in the Smith Barney 
lawsuit, awarded the complainant zero dollars (Antilla, pp. 271-289). 
Descriptive Information 
In our sample of nearly 3,200 employment arbitration cases, not all cases had 
complete information. The N values, however, remained high regardless of the variables 
included in the models we tested, with variable-specific N values ranging from 
approximately 2,400 to the full sample of nearly 3,200 cases. Regarding the amount 
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awarded, we considered not only the part of the award that represented all or part of a 
complainant’s principle claim (usually a claim for back pay or for unpaid compensation) 
but also any attorney fees claimed by either party and any claim for punitive damages. 
We deflated to 1986 dollars (using the CPI) both the total amount claimed by the 
complainant and the amount awarded, and we subtracted from the complainant’s award 
the deflated value of any successful counterclaim by the respondent14. (This means that 
if the arbitrator found merit in the counterclaim but not in the claim, our calculation of 
the net deflated claim would be a negative number.) Table 1 provides the descriptive 
information for all the dependent and independent variables, including coding schemes, 
numeric frequencies, and percent information. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The mean award across all cases is about $146,000, but this mean is the result of a 
highly skewed distribution of awards. The ten largest awards, for example, accounted for 
22 percent (over $101 million) of the total sum of money ($467 million) awarded in all of 
the FINRA cases. The median amount claimed was $375,000, while the median amount 
awarded was only $1,000—a mere quarter of a percent of the amount claimed. (These 
amounts are not deflated.)15 Across our entire sample, the mean deflated award for male 
complainants was $96,854, while the mean deflated award for females was $69,265. Of 
course, without controlling for other determinants of the awards, we cannot reach any 
meaningful conclusions about the interpretation of this difference. 
The skewed distribution of awards means that it would be inappropriate to use the 
amount of the monetary award as a dependent variable in an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression. Accordingly, following best practice, we use logistic regressions in 
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our analysis; in contrast to OLS, logistic regressions do not require that the dependent 
variable be normally distributed. To use logistic regressions, the dependent variable 
needs to be defined in dichotomous terms. Therefore, in our analysis we chose to use 
four definitions to denote what might be defined (for the sake of convenience) as a “win” 
or a “loss” for the claimant, and to test each as a dependent variable in our regression 
models. Each variable was dichotomized, with 0 representing a loss and 1 representing a 
win. 
Our first approach counted any positive award at all as a win for the claimant (that 
is, any total award greater than zero), which is a common approach in empirical research 
on arbitration win rates (for a very useful summary of this research, see Gough, 20090). 
The problem with using this definition of a “win”, however, is that it ignores the 
relationship between the size of the award and the size of the claim; suppose a claimant 
files a claim for $10 million but is awarded only $1,000: should that award be considered 
a win for the claimant? It seems to us that using the relative size of awards is a better 
indicator of how well claimants do in arbitration than using the absolute size of awards. 
Accordingly, we decided to use successively more restrictive definitions of a claimant 
“win.” By using four relative definitions of a win, we provide one basis for testing the 
robustness of our findings. 
Using the first definition of a win, we found that 58.3 percent of the FINRA cases 
yielded outcomes greater than zero (N = 1676). Our second definition of the dependent 
variable considered a win as any award greater than 25 percent of the amount claimed. 
Under this approach, complainants in 25.7 percent of the cases (N = 802) were victorious. 
Our third approach, which further narrowed the definition of a win, counted as winners 
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only cases with awards greater than 50 percent of the amount claimed. This definition 
yielded successful claims in 19.4 percent of the awards (N = 559). Our final definition 
counted a win as any award greater than 75 percent of the total amount claimed. Using 
this narrowest definition of victory, 14.6 percent of the awards (N = 421) resulted in 
victories for the claimant. 
The key independent variables in our regressions are the gender of the various 
participants involved in the arbitration. These include the gender of the claimant, the 
gender of the claimant’s attorney, the gender of the respondent’s attorney, and the gender 
of the arbitrator.16 (It is probably obvious that we could not include the respondent’s 
gender because in virtually all the cases the respondents were firms or companies and not 
individuals.) Across all of our gender variables, we found a heavy male presence: about 
84 percent of the arbitrators were men, 85 percent of the claimants were men, and 90 
percent of their attorneys were men; approximately 75 percent of the respondents’ 
attorneys were men. We used the individual’s first name to determine the gender of the 
participant, so there may be some level of error-- although it turned out that identifying 
the gender of any of the participants was a problem in only a handful of cases. Where the 
first name was ambiguous (e.g., Casey), we excluded the case from the analysis. 
We included a number of control variables in our analysis. For each of the 
models we estimated, we included the state in which the arbitration occurred (New York, 
California, and all others); the year issued (1988-2008, continuous); the number of 
hearing sessions (zero, 1 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 16 to 20, and more than 20); and the 
amount claimed (less than $25,000, $25,000 to $100,000, $100,000 to $1 million, and 
more than $1 million). Reference categories were accorded to other state, more than 20 
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hearing sessions, more than $1 million claimed, and all of the female gender variables, 
respectively.17 
We performed a series of tests to ensure that none of our models suffered from 
multicollinearity or any other methodological concerns. For example, we employed 
statistical tools such as condition indexes and tolerance/VIF tests, in addition to a 
standard correlation matrix, to establish that none of the independent variables 
meaningfully influenced any of the other variables within the models we estimated. Also, 
we do not think it is likely that endogeneity arising from reverse causality exists in any of 
our regressions, although we readily acknowledge that (given the nature of our database) 
we may have an omitted variables problem (a matter we will turn to in a subsequent 
section). 
In one of our simplest tests we generated a series of crosstabs to see whether –on 
the surface, at least—there was a relationship between our various definitions of “win” 
and the key gender variables. We found that the proportion of awards won by male 
claimants was consistently higher than the proportion won by female claimants, 
regardless of the definition of a “win”. We also found that claimant attorneys who were 
men won a higher proportion of their cases than claimant attorneys who were women— 
again, regardless of the definition of a win. In other words, this finding seems to suggest 
that both female and male claimants did somewhat better when they were represented by 
a male attorney. Curiously, we also found that respondents did somewhat better when 
they were represented by a female attorney. Finally, the arbitrator’s gender also appeared 
to make a difference: the awards issued by male arbitrators across all four definitions of 
a win were somewhat lower than the awards issued by female arbitrators. Although the 
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results seem to suggest that the gender of the principal participants was related to the 
outcomes in these cases, they do not tell us a great deal without controlling for other 
variables that may influence these outcomes. 
Logistic Regressions 
Tables 2 through 5 present our regression results. Each table shows the regression 
estimates for one of our four dependent variables and also reports the N size, Nagelkerke 
R2, unstandardized beta coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratios. 
Logistic Regression for Any Award Greater than Zero 
Table 2 shows the logistic regression results when we define claimant victory as 
any award greater than zero. The model fits the data well, easily passing the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test, although the pseudo R2 was not particularly high. We 
found that any claimant win was influenced by the location of the arbitration hearing, the 
number of hearing sessions, the size of the claim, and the gender of the claimant. In 
terms of location, we found that cases heard in New York appeared to result in claimant 
victories more often than cases heard in other states (p<.05). Regarding the number of 
sessions, we found that fewer sessions (zero and 1 to 5) were less likely to yield awards 
greater than zero (p<.05 and p<.01 respectively) than cases with more than twenty 
sessions. The regression in Table 3 also suggests that the amount of the claim 
significantly influenced the likelihood of a claimant victory, with smaller claims far less 
likely to result in awards above zero than claims of over $1 million (p<.01 for all claim 
sizes). Finally, we found a clear gender effect for claimants. Male claimants were 
substantially more likely to win anything at all, and Table 2 shows that men had a 34.4 
percent greater likelihood than women of being awarded more than zero percent of the 
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amount claimed (p<.05). The gender of the claimant’s attorney, respondent’s attorney, 
and the arbitrator did not significantly influence awards, using our first definition of 
victory. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Logistic Regression for Awards Greater than 25 Percent of Amount Claimed 
Our second definition of the dependent variable assumes that a claimant victory is 
a positive award greater than 25 percent of the amount claimed. Table 3 provides the 
logistic regression for our model using this definition of the dependent variable. Again 
the model fit well, passing the Hosmer and Lemeshow test and offering a considerably 
stronger pseudo R2 of .260. In common with the results for our first dependent variable, 
we found that location, number of sessions, amount claimed, and gender significantly 
influence awards. Cases in New York again were more likely to yield victories for 
claimants (p<.01). The number of hearing sessions is again significant, with fewer 
sessions (zero, 1 to 5, and 6 to 10) less likely to yield victories under our second 
definition (p<.01 for all). The amount claimed has a highly significant effect on awards, 
with all levels of the amount claimed significantly less likely to result in claimant 
victories than the reference category, greater than $1 million (p<.01 for all). Finally, we 
find an even stronger gender effect for this second definition of our dependent variable. 
Both claimant gender (p<.10) and the gender of the claimant’s attorney (p<.01) 
significantly influenced awards. Male claimants were again about 34 percent more likely 
to win than female claimants; especially noteworthy, however, is the finding that the 
gender of the claimant’s attorney has an even larger influence on awards than the gender 
of the claimant. Claimants’ attorneys who are men were 80.5 percent more likely to gain 
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victories than claimants’ attorneys who are women. For our second definition of the 
dependent variable, the results for the gender of the respondent’s attorney and the gender 
of the arbitrator are the same as they were for our first definition of the dependent 
variable: neither variable is statistically significant. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Logistic Regression for Awards Greater than 50 Percent of Amount Claimed 
The third definition of our dependent variable assumes that any award greater 
than 50 percent of the amount claimed is a win for the claimant; the results for this 
definition of the dependent variable can be found in Table 4. Again, we find that the 
model fits well, passing the goodness-of-fit test and yielding a Nagelkerke R2 of .309. 
We also fine that the year issued, number of sessions, amount claimed, and gender are all 
significant. In contrast to the previous regressions, however, location is not significant. 
On the other hand, the year the award was issued appears to matter, although only 
slightly (p<.01). Table 4 shows that the number of sessions again has a significant effect 
on awards (p<.01 for all). It also shows that the amount claimed was once again highly 
significant and negative for smaller claims (p<.01). Finally, we again find that the gender 
of the claimant and the claimant’s attorney have a significant effect on awards. The 
effects of these gender variables are similar to the effects that we found in our previous 
regression results. Male claimants were substantially more likely (p<.10) than female 
claimants to achieve victories, with a positive award likelihood of 1.449, higher than it 
was in any of the previous regressions. The gender of the claimant’s attorney was again 
significant (p<.05), with male attorneys about 68 percent more likely than female 
attorneys to win an award more than 50 percent greater than the amount claimed. Lastly, 
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the gender of the respondent’s attorney and the gender of the arbitrator again do not have 
a significant effect on awards. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Logistic Regression for Awards Greater Than 75 Percent of Amount Claimed 
The fourth and final definition of our dependent variable assumes that a claimant 
victory is any award greater than 75 percent of the amount claimed. This represents the 
most restricted definition of victory, and the results can be seen in Table 5. Not 
surprisingly, given the previous results, we find that the model fits the data very well, 
with strong Hosmer and Lemeshow results and a Nagelkerke R2 of .363, the highest of all 
our regressions. Regarding the independent variables, we find statistical significance for 
the year the award was issued, the number of hearing sessions, amount claimed, and the 
gender of the claimant and the claimant’s attorney. In common with the previous 
regression, location does not have a significant effect on awards. Table 5 shows that the 
year an award was issued has a significant effect on awards (p<.01), similar to the effect 
the variable had in our previous regression. This finding suggests, of course, that in 
recent years claimants were much more likely to win relatively large awards (greater than 
50 percent or 75 percent of the amount claimed) than they were in the earlier years of the 
FINRA program. Also, again fewer sessions (zero, 1 to 5, and 6 to 10) led to a lower 
likelihood of claimant victory (p<.01 for all). The amount claimed was once again 
significant: all lower levels of the amount claimed had a significant negative effect on 
awards, compared to the highest category of amount claimed (p<.01 for all). Finally, we 
once again find a gender effect, although it is quite different from the gender effect we 
found in our previous regressions. Table 5 shows that the gender of the claimant no 
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longer has a significant effect on awards. However, the gender of the claimant’s attorney 
has an even greater effect on awards than it had in our previous regressions. It appears 
that claimants (both male and female) who are represented by male attorneys are over 
twice as likely to win relatively large awards (greater than 75 percent of the amount 
claimed) than claimants who are represented by female attorneys (p<.05). However, 
before we rush to the conclusion that claimants in FINRA arbitration cases ought to retain 
male attorneys, we need to interpret our results more carefully and consider what 
“gender” actually means in our analysis. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Interpreting Our Results 
We think it is quite unlikely that our statistical results should be interpreted to 
mean that there is overt discrimination against women in FINRA arbitration cases. 
Consider our finding that the gender of the arbitrator does not affect the relative size of 
the award. We did not find, for example, that male claimants obtained larger awards 
when the arbitrator was a male, nor did we find that female claimants obtained larger 
awards when the arbitrator was a female. Rather, we found that male claimants did better 
than female claimants regardless of the gender of the arbitrator. In our view this finding 
provides at least limited support for our belief that FINRA arbitrators do not overtly 
discriminate against women. On the other hand, one might argue that both male and 
female arbitrators might be affected by a subtler form of bias: it is possible that 
arbitrators are unconsciously affected by deeply rooted cultural stereotypes about men 
and women, and without realizing it find more merit in the claims brought by men than 
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they do in the claims brought by women, even when the claims are essentially equally 
meritorious. 
Another possibility is that there is a systematic difference between the merit of the 
claims brought by men and the merit of the claims brought by women. It is at least 
conceivable that, on the whole, male claimants have more meritorious claims than female 
claimants. We do not have sufficient evidence to draw any conclusions about this 
proposition; for example, we have no information about the number and nature of filings 
by male and female claimants. There is of course a lengthy process that precedes the 
issuance of an arbitration award. It typically involves both negotiation and mediation, 
and there are often motions by one party or the other that need to be heard by a court. 
Without knowing a lot more about what happens in those processes, it is difficult to draw 
solid conclusions on the basis of our findings. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
employers are more inclined to negotiate settlements with women than they are with men 
who have equally meritorious claims. One can imagine some Wall Street firms, with 
dubious reputations regarding the employment of women, deciding that it was a better 
strategy to settle complaints brought by women rather than proceed to arbitration and 
very likely court hearings that would put the firm in the public spotlight. 
One can imagine other scenarios that would help explain our results. For example, 
it is quite likely, given what we know about the nature of employment in the securities 
industry, that female claimants who proceed to arbitration have less service or seniority in 
the industry than male claimants. It is possible that male claimants have been “bigger 
earners” than female claimants, and since a significant part of the arbitration awards is 
based on the claimants’ earnings, it would follow that male claimants would obtain larger 
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awards than female claimants. Regrettably, however, we do not have any data on the 
service, seniority, or earnings of the claimants. The absence of these kinds of data 
illustrates the omitted variables problem we acknowledged earlier in the paper. 
A companion argument, it might be noted, is that male claimants might be 
employed by more successful or profitable firms (or branches of firms) than female 
claimants. If men are more likely to be employed by elite investment banks in New York 
City and women are more likely to be employed by brokerages in smaller cities, then one 
would expect (all other things being equal) that male claimants would obtain larger 
arbitration awards than female claimants. Again, regrettably, we lack the data to test this 
hypothesis. 
Turning to our results for the claimants’ attorneys, it is quite possible that 
“gender” in this case is a proxy for experience. We know that the legal profession, 
especially in New York City, continues to be dominated by men: the majority of the 
partners in most firms are men, although many of the younger associates are women.18 A 
systematic difference between male attorney experience and female attorney experience 
in the FINRA arbitration cases might very well explain our regression results. Once 
again, however, we lack the data to test this hypothesis. (Conceivably, we could expand 
our database to include personal characteristics and human capital variables for all the 
attorneys who have appeared in FINRA arbitration cases, but quite obviously that would 
be a Herculean task.) 
Fortunately, however, we do have enough data to examine some of the alternative 
explanations for our regression results. Our main ambition in conducting these additional 
tests was to find out whether gender lost its significance when we used different 
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specifications of our regression equations. In one experiment, for example, we changed 
the model parameters by converting the number of hearing sessions and the amount of the 
claim from categorical to continuous variables, and we converted the year the award was 
issued from a continuous variable to a categorical one. Although the overall structure of 
the model changed somewhat when we performed these tests, the gender of the claimant 
and of the claimant’s attorney continued to have a significant effect on outcomes. 
In addition, we could also test for the experience of the claimants, the claimants’ 
attorneys, the respondents’ attorneys, and the arbitrators within the FINRA arbitration 
system. We created an assortment of experience variables for these participants. For 
example, we could account for how many times a claimant’s attorney or a respondent’s 
attorney appeared in FINRA arbitration hearings. We ran tests to determine whether 
attorneys who appeared in more than one case obtained better awards than attorneys who 
appeared only once. We also distinguished attorneys who ranked in the “top ten” in 
terms of the number of FINRA cases they had handled from all other attorneys. We also 
constructed the experience variables for arbitrators and for claimants (187 individuals 
were claimants in more than one arbitration case). We found that these experience 
variables did significantly affect outcomes, but they did not eliminate the gender effects. 
In fact, the gender effects were virtually the same as those we report in this paper. It 
appears that the influence of gender on outcomes is independent of the influence of 
experience on outcomes. But we readily acknowledge experience in the FINRA system 
is a very limited measure of overall experience. For example, a better measure of the 
experience of the attorneys and the arbitrators would include their experience in 
arbitration cases conducted under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 
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JAMS, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and other providers. 
Constructing that kind of experience variable would be a difficult if not impossible task. 
In our database we discovered that some claimants were not represented by an 
attorney. In close to 10 percent of the cases the coders at FINRA indicated that a case 
was a pro se one, but in another 10 percent of the cases information on whether the case 
was a pro se one or not is simply missing, so it is conceivable that as many as 20 percent 
of the cases fall in the pro se category. There was no meaningful difference between the 
number of male claimants and the number of female claimants in this category, however 
it was defined, and we discovered that the variables we constructed for pro se cases had 
no significant effect on awards. In the regressions we present in this paper we eliminated 
these cases from the analysis. 
We also ran a series of interaction terms in our regressions. For example, in one 
experiment we interacted the gender of the claimant with the gender of the claimant’s 
attorney, but when that interaction term is included in a regression that also contains both 
of the gender variables entered separately there is too much multicollinearity to produce 
significance for any of the three variables. When only the interaction term is entered in 
the regressions, it proves to be significant in some of the regressions but not in others. 
By far we obtained the strongest and most robust results when we used the regression 
specifications presented in this paper. 
We also hypothesized that there might be an interaction effect between the gender 
of the claimant and the amount claimed. The amount of the claim has a significant effect 
on awards in all the regressions we have tested. We theorize that there might be a 
relationship between mail claimants and the amount claimed that help to explain why 
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mail claimants win larger awards. But when we included both the original and the 
interactive terms in the regressions, we found that the interaction term was not significant, 
but the original gender and amount claimed variables continued to have a significant 
influence on outcomes. Once again, the gender of the claimant appears to act 
independently of the amount claimed in determining arbitration outcomes. 
Finally, we examined the experience of the respondents in the FINRA arbitration 
system. In another paper we are preparing, we examine whether repeat players in FINRA 
arbitration cases have an advantage over one-time players, whether they are claimants or 
respondents. We discovered that the five firms that have most frequently been 
respondents in FINRA arbitration cases account for 608, or nearly 20 percent, of all the 
awards (Lipsky, Seeber, and Lamare, p. 58). We developed alternative definitions of the 
repeat-player effect and tested them in our regressions, and we found that in some cases 
(depending on the definition) repeat-player variables had significant effects on outcomes. 
But in all these experiments the gender effects followed the same pattern that we report in 
this paper, and in some cases the gender effects were enhanced. We conclude that the 
gender effects we report in this paper are independent of repeat-player effects. 
Conclusion 
In this concluding section we would like to move beyond the limitations of our 
quantitative analyses and further into the realm of speculation. We have conducted 
numerous regression experiments, using various definitions of the dependent variable and 
various specifications of the estimating equations, and we have tested a variety of 
hypotheses that might possibly explain the gender effects. (We have reported only some 
of our results in this paper.) We discovered that the gender effects reported here are 
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remarkably stable and robust across the range of experiments we conducted. As we have 
noted, we believe that gender in our results might plausibly be a proxy for other factors 
that influence the experience of men and women in the FINRA arbitration process. But 
we have a suspicion that even if we had the data to explain what “gender” actually means 
in our analysis, there would still be a residual that represented the effects of gender per se 
on arbitration outcomes. We suspect that the numerous accounts—in court cases, in 
scholarly articles, and in the popular media—of the entrenched sexism that infects Wall 
Street is reflected in the experience women have in arbitration. We are confident that 
FINRA has done its best to construct a level playing field for men and women in 
arbitration—it has promulgated numerous rules designed to guarantee equity and fair 
treatment in its proceedings. But until the securities industry, and especially the major 
Wall Street firms, are truly committed to providing women with equal opportunity and 
fair treatment, the gender effects we have uncovered in FINRA arbitration awards are 
likely to persist. 
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Figure 1: Types of Claims 
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Wrongful 
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Other 
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Table 1: Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Variables 
Variable 
DEPENDENT 
No Win 
Any Win > 0 
Win > 25% Claimed 
Win > 50% Claimed 
Win > 75% Claimed 
INDEPENDENT 
New York 
California 
Other State 
Year Issued 
Zero Sessions 
1 to 5 Sessions 
6 to 10 Sessions 
11 to 15 Sessions 
16 to 20 Sessions 
20-plus Sessions 
>25K Claimed 
25K to 100K Claimed 
100K to 1M Claimed 
<1M Claimed 
Claimant Gender (Male) 
Clm. Atty. Gender (Male) 
Rspdt. Atty .Gender (Male) 
Arbitrator Gender (Male) 
Coding Scheme 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical (ref.) 
Continuous 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical (ref.) 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical 
Categorical (ref.) 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Dichotomous 
Frequency 
1199 
1676 
802 
559 
421 
1089 
374 
1658 
---
446 
1256 
778 
250 
134 
204 
589 
464 
1030 
730 
2617 
2198 
2199 
2567 
Percent 
41.7 
58.3 
25.7 
19.4 
14.6 
34.9 
12.0 
53.1 
---
14.5 
41.0 
25.3 
8.1 
4.4 
6.6 
20.9 
16.5 
36.6 
26.0 
84.6 
90.0 
78.3 
83.6 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression for Any Award Greater Than Zero 
N = 2035 
Variable 
New York 
California 
Year Issued 
Zero Sessions 
1 to 5 Sessions 
6 to 10 Sessions 
11 to 15 Sessions 
16 to 20 Sessions 
>25K Claim 
25K to 100K Claim 
100K to 1M Claim 
Male Claimant 
Male Claimant Atty. 
Male Respdt. Atty. 
Male Arbitrator 
Constant 
Unstd. B 
.215** 
-.246 
.001 
-.609** 
-.666*** 
-.265 
.354 
.099 
-.549*** 
-.872*** 
-.889*** 
.296** 
.191 
.043 
.039 
-1.335 
Nagelkerke R2 = .051 
S.E. 
.103 
.150 
.011 
.244 
.196 
.192 
.236 
.276 
.193 
.174 
.188 
.128 
.156 
.114 
.126 
21.926 
Odds 
1.240 
.782 
1.001 
.544 
.514 
.768 
1.424 
1.104 
.578 
.418 
.411 
1.344 
1.211 
1.044 
1.040 
.263 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level 
Hosmer and Lemeshow significance = .312 
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Table 3: Logistic Regression for Awards Greater Than 25 Percent of the Amount 
Claimed 
N = 2035 
Variable 
New York 
California 
Year Issued 
Zero Sessions 
1 to 5 Sessions 
6 to 10 Sessions 
11 to 15 Sessions 
16 to 20 Sessions 
>25K Claim 
25K to 100K Claim 
100K to 1M Claim 
Male Claimant 
Male Claimant Atty. 
Male Respdt. Atty. 
Male Arbitrator 
Constant 
Unstd. B 
.360*** 
-.080 
.013 
-1.573*** 
-1.176*** 
-.930*** 
-.017 
-.389 
-1.246*** 
-2.173*** 
-3.857*** 
.293* 
.590*** 
.181 
-.161 
-25.000 
Nagelkerke R2 = .260 
S.E. 
.122 
.188 
.013 
.307 
.247 
.244 
.269 
.329 
.193 
.185 
.242 
.160 
.202 
.140 
.150 
26.456 
Odds 
1.434 
.923 
1.013 
.207 
.309 
.395 
.983 
.677 
.288 
.114 
.021 
1.340 
1.805 
1.199 
.851 
.000 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level 
Hosmer and Lemeshow significance = .349 
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Table 4: Logistic Regression for Awards Greater Than 50 Percent of Amount 
Claimed 
N = 2035 
Variable 
New York 
California 
Year Issued 
Zero Sessions 
1 to 5 Sessions 
6 to 10 Sessions 
11 to 15 Sessions 
16 to 20 Sessions 
>25K Claim 
25K to 100K Claim 
100K to 1M Claim 
Male Claimant 
Male Claimant Atty. 
Male Respdt. Atty. 
Male Arbitrator 
Constant 
Unstd. B 
.237 
-.065 
.045*** 
-1.691*** 
-1.566*** 
-1.263*** 
-.187 
-.304 
-1.404*** 
-2.711*** 
-4.459*** 
.371* 
.521** 
.218 
-.040 
-88.774*** 
Nagelkerke R2 = .309 
S.E. 
.145 
.223 
.016 
.349 
.294 
.295 
.317 
.380 
.196 
.200 
.292 
.194 
.239 
.166 
.179 
31.471 
Odds 
1.268 
.937 
1.046 
.184 
.209 
.283 
.830 
.738 
.246 
.066 
.012 
1.449 
1.683 
1.243 
.960 
.000 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level 
Hosmer and Lemeshow significance = .301 
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Table 5: Logistic Regression for Awards Greater Than 75 Percent of Amount 
Claimed 
N = 2035 
Variable 
New York 
California 
Year Issued 
Zero Sessions 
1 to 5 Sessions 
6 to 10 Sessions 
11 to 15 Sessions 
16 to 20 Sessions 
>25K Claim 
25K to 100K Claim 
100K to 1M Claim 
Male Claimant 
Male Claimant Atty. 
Male Respdt. Atty. 
Male Arbitrator 
Constant 
Unstd. B 
.240 
.094 
.072*** 
-1.790*** 
-1.88*** 
-1.381*** 
.429 
-.349 
-1.632*** 
-3.130*** 
-5.292*** 
.370 
.712** 
.196 
-.052 
-143.435*** 
Nagelkerke R2 = .363 
S.E. 
.168 
.251 
.018 
.399 
.350 
.352 
.384 
.450 
.207 
.224 
.381 
.225 
.283 
.189 
.204 
36.646 
Odds 
1.271 
1.098 
1.075 
.167 
.151 
.251 
.651 
.706 
.196 
.044 
.005 
1.447 
2.039 
1.217 
.950 
.000 
*** = Significant at the .01 level; ** = Significant at the .05 level; * = Significant at the .10 level 
Hosmer and Lemeshow significance = .341 
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1
 Some observers believe that discrimination against African Americans and other minorities is at least as 
serious as discrimination against women in the securities industry. As one reporter noted, “For far too long 
[Wall Street] has been a club stooped [sic?] in exclusivity. Needless to say, seeking out qualified African 
Americans for membership has never been a priority of chief executives of the major investment banks” 
(Clarke and McCoy, 1992). 
2
 Most notably, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) and Circuit City Stores v. 
Saint Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). Several of the Supreme Court’s most important decisions 
regarding employment and consumer arbitration, including Gilmer, originated in the securities industry. 
For example, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) held that investors who sign 
predispute arbitration agreements with their brokers could be compelled to arbitrate claims arising under 
the Securities and Exchange Act, and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477 (1989) overturned Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which held that claims arising under the 
Securities Act could not be compelled to arbitration by means of a contract. 
3
 Several of these criticisms of mandatory arbitration are stated in the findings section of a bill, called the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, which was considered in the last session of Congress. This bill, co-sponsored by 
Congressman Johnson and Senator Finegold, would amend the Federal Arbitration Act to ban the use of 
mandatory predispute arbitration agreements in employment, consumer, franchise, and civil rights disputes. 
For an assessment of the Arbitration Fairness Act, see Fincher, et al., 2009. 
4
 Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 113, (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 957 F. 
Supp. 1460 (N.D.Ill. 1997); EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The 
Martens case is the principal focus of Antilla’s book (Antilla, 2002). 
5
 “2010 Working Mother 100 Best Companies,” Working Mother, found at 
http://www.workingmother.com/BestCompanies/2010/08/2010-working-mother-100-best-companies, 
accessed on December 29, 2010. According to Working Mother, about 50 percent of Prudential’s managers, 
senior managers, and corporate executives are women. Prudential has been ranked as the nineteenth best 
employer in the U.S. by Computerworld; see “Special Report: 100 Best Places to Work in IT, 2010,” 
Computerworld, found at http://www.computerworld.com/spring/bp/detail/718, accessed on December 29, 
2010. Prudential, of course, is not a perfect employer: each year scores of its employees have filed 
complaints with its internal dispute resolution program, and some of these complaints allege discrimination. 
Since the company’s program was established in the late 1990s, not a single employee has elected to use 
the arbitration option available in the company’s system, although quite a few have used FINRA’s dispute 
resolution program. The development of Prudential’s integrated conflict management system is discussed 
in Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher (2003). 
6
 This section is drawn largely from Lipsky, Seeber, and Lamare, 2010. 
7
 FINRA is classified as a self-regulatory organization (SRO). The SEC delegates to FINRA responsibility 
for enforcing certain industry standards and requirements related to brokerage and trading activities. 
8
 For a description of FINRA’s dispute resolution programs, including the rules FINRA uses in arbitration 
cases, see http://www.finra.org/index.htm, accessed on January 30, 2010. We also draw here on Janice 
Kwon, “Securities Industry Arbitration: Overview of the Industry and the Debate Over Self-Regulatory 
Organizations,” unpublished paper prepared for the Association for Conflict Resolution Task Force charged 
with examining the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009. Another useful source is Jill Gross and Alice Oshins, 
eds., Investor’s Guide to Securities Industry Disputes: How to Prevent and Resolve Disputes with Your 
Broker (New York, NY: Pace Law School and FINRA Investor Education Foundation, n.d.). Very little 
legal or empirical research has been conducted on arbitration in the securities industry. On the occasion of 
the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 
U.S. 220 (1987), the University of Cincinnati College of Law sponsored a symposium, “The Current State 
of Securities Arbitration,” which featured several papers by leading practitioners and scholars in the field; 
the symposium was published in 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 459 (2007-08). 
9
 Between 1986 and 1993 there were about 600 employment arbitration awards. The data cited in this 
paragraph are from records made available to the authors by FINRA. 
10
 FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics, found at 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/, accessed on February 9, 2010. 
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11
 Jill Gross is possibly the leading scholar on the arbitration of investor claims against securities firms. Of 
the many articles she has written on the topic, see, for example, Gross, 2001, 2006, and 2010. 
12
 It should be noted that in many cases employees filed multiple charges. For example, in a handful of 
cases the employee filed a charge of both sex and age discrimination. The data we present here are based 
only on the primary allegation in each case. 
13
 Antilla describes a number of fears that women claimants and their attorneys had about arbitration. For 
example, she notes that in both arbitration hearings and courtroom proceedings women are “vulnerable to 
the trauma of a psychiatric evaluation.” But, she says, “courtrooms provide more protections than do the 
informal auspices of an arbitration. In court, for example, [the claimant’s attorney] could get her client a 
protective order to keep invasive information private, and if the order were violated, it could lead to 
contempt proceedings” (Antilla, p. 151). 
14
 Firms in the securities industry often require a newly hired broker to sign a promissory note, which calls 
for the broker to pay the firm, out of the broker’s commissions, a certain amount of money (sometimes in 
the six-figure range) within a certain time period (say, three or five years). Consider a case in which a 
broker is (for example) terminated, the broker files a charge against his employer, and the case goes to 
arbitration: if the broker has not paid off his promissory note, typically his (former) employer will file a 
counterclaim, demanding that the he/she do so. 
15
 These results were first presented in Lipsky, Seeber, and Lamare, 2010. The single largest award in the 
FINRA cases was in Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed; an arbitration panel awarded Sawtelle $27.6 million (of 
which $25 million was for punitive damages). See Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc. (Docket No. 97-03642, 
award issued Aug. 7, 2001; 2001 NASD Arb. Lexis 820). 
16
 If an arbitration panel heard the case, we only coded the gender of the chair of the panel on the grounds 
that the chair is the key decision maker in these arbitration cases. 
17
 As noted earlier, the arbitration program in the securities industry was established in 1986, but only a 
handful of awards were issued in 1986 and 1987. About sixty awards were issued in 1988, and so we begin 
our analysis in that year. Also, a hearing session in our database is defined as half a day. The mean 
number of hearing sessions for all cases was 7.4 (i.e., 3.7 days). 
18
 There are, of course, some major exceptions to this generalization. The New York law firm headed by 
Judith Vladeck has been a major player in both arbitration and court cases involving Wall Street firms. 
Other female attorneys play a prominent role in Antilla’s narrative of the class action lawsuits that have 
unfolded in recent years (Antilla, 2002). 
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